Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 Fourth-level student of Jurisprudence of Education, Islamic Seminary of Qom, Qom, Iran.
2 Professor of external courses at Qom Seminary, Qom, Iran.
Abstract
Objective: This study aims to determine the "limits of religious education concerning the principle of monotheism (tawḥīd)" from a jurisprudential (fiqhī) perspective. Given the responsibility of parents and educators in the religious education of children, the main question is what amount of knowledge related to God (His essence, oneness, and attributes) must be taught as obligatory, and what amount falls outside the scope of obligation.
Method: This research was conducted using an inferential method with an ijtihādī approach. First, the requirements of the practical principle (al-barāʾah and al-iḥtiyāṭ) and general educational proofs (verses and comprehensive traditions on education, as well as rules such as guiding the ignorant and guidance) were examined. Next, specific proofs including reason, Qur'anic verses, consensus (ijmāʿ), the established practice of the religious community (irtikāz al-mutasharriʿah), and three categories of traditions related to knowledge of God's essence, oneness, and attributes were evaluated in terms of their chains of transmission (sanad) and implications (dalālah). Finally, by synthesizing the proofs, the obligatory limits of religious education were deduced.
Results: The practical principle of iḥtiyāṭ (precaution) necessitates that caution be observed in religious education. General educational proofs indicate the obligation of education in principle but do not specify its precise limits. Among the specific proofs, rational arguments (the obligation to thank the benefactor and the avoidance of probable harm) only require a general and summary knowledge of God. Qur'anic verses primarily address the consequences of disbelief. Documented consensus (ijmāʿ madrakī) and irtikāz al-mutasharriʿah lack sufficient validity for determining detailed limits. Authentic traditions (the first and second categories) indicate the obligation of knowing God's essence and oneness through the testimony "Lā ilāha illā Allāh." A contextual analysis of these traditions shows that this testimony necessarily entails knowledge of a set of key divine attributes (life, knowledge, power, wisdom, and sovereignty) that distinguish the true object of worship from false ones.
Conclusion: The obligatory limit in the religious education of monotheism consists of a general knowledge of God's essence and oneness, along with teaching the attributes that play a role in realizing true servitude ('ubūdiyyah). Detailed knowledge of all divine attributes and the higher levels of monotheism is not obligatory.
Keywords
- Education
- religious education
- the principle of monotheism
- jurisprudence of education
- limits of education
- child education
Main Subjects